'The nature of the firm' after sixty years by Elzas, B.D.
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometric
SERIE  RESEARCH MEMORANDA
‘The Nature of the Firm’ after sixty years
B.D. Elzas
Research Memorandum 1998-32
M a y  1 9 9 8
vrije Universiteit ams tevdam
3.
‘The Nature of the Firm’ after sixty years
by B.D. Elzas
Vakgroep Algemene  Economic
Onderzoekgroep Geschiedenis  van bet  Economisch  Denken
May 1998
.
"The Nature of the FimP after sixty years
by B.D. Elzas'
Introduction
It is a well-known fact that the overwhelming majority of the
new publications in any scientific discipline are no more than
contributions within an already existing approach in the
discipline concerned. Only a tiny fraction of all scientific
books and articles may be considered - at least in retrospect
- as attempts to examine an existing problem from another
viewpoint than the traditional ones within the discipline. One
or two of these come as a bombshell, almost immediately
leading to heated debates in the leading scientific journals
and growing into something like a new 'orthodoxy' within a few
years. An example of this course of events in economics is
Keynes's "General Theory".
However, this is a very exceptional course of events. Even if
a new approach is eventually adopted in the discipline, the
normal course of events is that its success fails to materia-
lize for many years or even decades onend.  For instance, Gos-
sen's book of 1854 had no appreciable effect on the economic
insights of his contemparies. Only when the "Marginal Revolu-
tion" of the 1870's had already taken place, was Gossen's  work
rediscovered. When at last Jevons was made acquainted with it,
he honestly declared that, as far as principles were concer-
ned, he had only reinvented Gossen's  wheel (Jevons (18791,
1970, Preface, p. 61).
The adventures of the new approach in Coasels article "The
Nature of the Firm" (1937) were even more spectacular than
those of Gossen and they were much more gratifying for its
author in at least two respects. Notwithstanding the fact that
this approach began to arouse attention only twenty-five years
after its publication, Coase himself was able to enjoy it for
more than three decades already. Thus, he was enabled to take
an active part in the belated debates around it. Gossen was
the
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2years after his pioneering publication. Secondly, although in
Cease's case (just as in Gossen's) his 'wheel'  was more or
less reinvented by others, it has become known in the
profession at large under his name. As a consequence of his
taking an active part in the later discussions Coase now is
regarded not merely as a precursor, but as the father of a
subsequent development in economic theory.
In this essay a number of questions concerning this
pathbreaking publication by Coase are tentatively answered.
Historical enquiries seldomly lead to definitive answers,
because in principle there is always room left for different
interpretations of 'the facts' and their combinations. In
other words: history is no 'hard' science. So, for clarity's
sake, let us state the most ambitious questions in the most
straightforward and simple form:
1. How did Coase discover this new approach and what made him
decide to take it?
2. Why did it last so long before this approach, which even-
tually was acknowledged by a majority in the profession
to be very useful, was noticed at all?
3. What caused its ultimate breakthrough into the profession's
interest?
1. The discovery
1.1 The message
In case of a lucky strike (be it in a theoretical or an ap-
plied field of work) after the discovery has become part of
the generally accepted insights of the profession, it often is
not so easy to understand why the discovery was not made
earlier. The insight has then become so familiar to the
profession that its members have difficulty in feeling the
originality of the discovery any more. This also is the case
with the discovery reported by Coase in "The  Nature of the
Firm"  (Coase 1937). In order to let the reader undergo this
sensation of naturalness, Cease's message will be reproduced
briefly here:
According to Neoclassical price theory a market economy
provides, automatically and without any control from
3outside, for a perfect match between size and composition
of demand on the one hand and the allocation of the
factors of production on the other. In this theory it is
assumed that the direction of resources is dependent
directly on the price mechanism, that is: without delibe-
rate central control. If this is a correct representati-
on, why is it then, that firms, particles of centrally
guided economy, exist, as "islands of conscious power in
this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of
butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk." (Robertson,
1928, p. 85; cited by Coase, 1937, 1988, p. 35)?
Cease's answer to this question is that this is caused by
the fact that economic agents cannot use the market
costlessly: to use the market means incurring transaction
costs. Consequently it is always a question of weighing
up at the margin whether it will be cheaper to buy an
extra unit of a resource on the market, or produce it
'in-house'. If there were no organization costs within
the firm whatsoever, to be balanced against the costs of
using the market, the cheapest way of allocating in the
economy would be to have one big firm only between the
markets for production factors on the one hand, and the
markets for final products on the other. This big and
only firm would then act as the buying party and the
selling party respectively, of all transactions occurring
in the economy. However, allocation cannot occur free of
cost within the firm either, it always involves some
organization costs. It follows that there will be more
than one firm in any long-run equilibrium of the economy.
Moreover, normally there will be markets for at least
some intermediate products too.
Presumably no contemporary economist, upon reading the above
summary of this general theory on the existence and the demar-
cation of firms, would be impressed by the originality of the
message. It has taken root by now. At the time of publication
it-also did not make any impression, but for a different
reason. At that time the profession was just falling under the
spell of the Lausanne variant of the neoclassical approach. In
that approach the firm is simply assumed to exist as a
decision making unit. Therefore Cease's  theory was by far too
exotic and too original to be noticed.
In the beginning of the 'thirties Coase (born on 29 December
1910) was introduced to the neoclassical approach, but
studying for a degree in commerce instead of economics, he was
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not immersed in it. It may be presumed that this helped him to
persevere in regarding this approach as only an 'outsider'
could have done, i.e. in a detached and critical way. But
certainly this was not the only important factor, for many a
person with a less inquisitive, critical and bright mind would
have accomplished little with this independence. In observing
this we meet with one of the least assessable causes of
Cease's discovery: his exceptional intelligence. This, in
combination with a strong urge to investigate real-world
phenomena, at least twice led to highly original
investigations and results. Of course, the combination of
qualities, ascribed above to the young Coase cannot be
established directly now, more than sixty years later. But it
is possible to reconstruct it from his early publications and
from his later career.
1.2 On C&sews personal background
In 1987, fifty years after "The  Nature of the Firm' was first
published (Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, pp. 386-4051, a
conference was organized to celebrate this anniversary. The
organizers found themselves in the lucky circumstances that
the author, at that time 76 years old, was able not only to be
present at the conference, but also to give three lectures,
and thus to contribute substantially to the proceedings. In
his lectures he successively discussed the lloriginll,
"meaning', and "influence" of his article (Coase 1993 [19881).
Especially for discussing its origin he was qualified as no
one else could have been. In this section we shall use his
expositions under these three headings.
In order to answer our first question in the Introduction
(m(h)ow did Coase invent this new approach...?") it is neces-
sary to know something about Cease's personal background and
the state of economics at that time. Firstly, in terms of his
higher education Coase proves to be no typical general
economist at all. His higher education could be typified as
that of a business economist with a remarkably broad range of
subjects, a little bit of general economics being one of them.
Moreover, this bit he learnt already at secondary school where
5he followed a course of two years "...preparing  for the
external intermediate degree examinations of the University of
London (the equivalent of the first year of university work) .I1
(Origin, p.36). After making a false start for a science
degree he soon switched to studying for a commerce degree.
"This  move was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that I
was at that time a socialist and the interest in social
problems that this implies made the prospect of studying
economics (a requirement for a commerce degree) attracti-
ve. During the next two years I studied economics, geo-
graphy f French, English economic history and accoun-
ting..." (p. 36).
Having passed the examinations at eighteen, he went to the
London School of Economics (LSE) to continue his studies for a
commerce degree. In order to get an idea of his educational
background it seems proper to quote extensively from Origin:
"In 1929-1930, I worked for Part I of the final examina-
tion, taking courses in British foreign trade, the prin-
ciples of currency, the theory of production, industrial
relations, the economic development of the overseas
dominions, India and the tropical dependencies, commerci-
al law, statistical method, the organization of transport
and psychology. In 1930-1931, I decided to take group D
(industry) in Part 2 of the Bachelor of Commerce, a group
which was recommended for those wishing to enter the
engineering and metal trades, distributing trades (in
certain instances), and generally for those engaged in
works and factory management. It was a choice of occupa-
tion for which I was singularly ill-suited (...) In
studying for Part 2 in 1930-1931, I took courses in
French, accounting, business administration, works and
factory accounting and cost accounts, the raw materials
of industry and trade, problems of modern industry, the
financing of industry, industrial law, and industrial
. psychology." (p. 36)
Coase adds that the variety of subjects studied was very great
and therefore little time (let alone systematic reading) could
be devoted to each separately. Moreover, it shows that his
studies during these two years did not contain a course in
-----
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economics at all. His education was in a great measure that of
a practical business economist. Thus it seems that for his
later excellence in price theory other factors must be held
responsible. There was a little bit more of economics, and
especially of price-theoretical insights in his education,
however, than can be gleaned from the account given above. In
1930-1931, the lectures in business administration at the LSE
for the first time were given by Arnold Plant. In Origin Coase
explicitly states that it was Plant who provided him with his
basic approach to economics (p. 37). Basically, this was that
the price system, when combined with competition, has big
advantages over alternative coordination devices.
After passing for his final examination, Coase could not yet
be awarded the B. Corn. because three years' residence was
required for a degree. So in principle he had to study a year
longer at the LSE. However, he had been awarded a Cassel
travelling scholarship for the academic year 1931-1932 and his
study proposal, to be realized in the United States, was
accepted as a sufficient substitute for a year's further
residence. The accepted subject of study was the vertical and
lateral integration in industry. Fifty-six years later he
explains his choice for this subject as follows:
"My choice of subject (and it was my choice) undoubtedly
resulted from the fact that Plant had referred to the
different ways in which industries were organized. What
stimulated my interest was that we seemed to lack any
theory which would explain why those industries were
organized in the way they were." (Origin, p. 38).
Plant's influence shows not only in the choice of subject, but
also in the fact that Coase was puzzled by two of Plant's
publications of 1931, in which he opposed government
coordination of industries, arguing that competition would
provide all the coordination needed. Coase did not disagree
with this, but had the feeling that something was missing in
his.argument. With regard to the economic planning discussion,
kindled by the new planning experiment in the Soviet Union,
Coase had a similar, and indeed related, feeling. Some
maintained II.. .that  to run the economy as one big factory was
an impossibility.1V  (p. 39; Mises and Hayek belonged to these
'some'). "And yet there were factories in England and America.
7How did one reconcile the impossibility of running Russia as
one big factory with the existence of factories in the western
world?11 (ibid.).
Thus we see that Coase, only twenty years of age at the time,
was a real outsider in economics from the start. He really
believed what he had learned from Plant about coordination by
competition, Yet he did not believe it completely. Our
proposition is, that the strong business economic accent in
his education was one of the causal factors for this 'heresy'.
Of course there were other factors, like intellect and
character, contributing to his dissent. But the study of
business economic subjects means that one has to put the
management of the firm in the central place. Whether the
subject is 'finance', 'cost accounting', 'profit assesment',
or 'management of personnel', they all require a view of the
firm from within. So, the firm cannot be dealt with as an
indivisible unit (or 'black box'), as it is in neoclassical
price theory.
A second remarkable fact appears from the story of his inves-
tigations in the United States. What .he read there, were not
only
11
. . . reports of the Federal Trade Commission and books
describing the organization of different industries (...I
I also read trade periodicals and used more unusual
sources (for an economist), such as the yellow pages of
the telephone directory, where I was fascinated to find
so many specialist firms operating within what we thought
of as a single industry as well as such interesting
combinations of activities as those represented by coal
and ice companies.ll  (p. 39)
The remarkable thing is that he studied these kinds of
practical sources. Again, this was a rather unusual thing to
do for an economist, but not so for a business economist. In
the course of his studies, moreover, he did not only visit
universities, but many firm establishments as well. As he
remarks in 1987 ( Meaning, p. 52):
I? . ..I tried to find the reason for the existence of the
firm in factories and offices rather than in the writings
V -
8of economists (.. .) (M)y aim was to discover a ltrealistic
assumption.*'Vt
Perhaps this ambition should also be ascribed to his education
as a business economist, or it could be more related to his
character. Anyway, it shows a great measure of open-mindedness
on Cease's  part beside an intense interest in 'pedestrian'
facts. He has maintained this interest, as is evident from
many of his publications from the mid- 'thirties till the early
'nineties.
One more fact merits signalling here. He relates in Origin (p.
34/35)  that he had completed the framework of the theory that
was published in "The  Nature of the Firm"  already by the
autumn of 1932, when he was only twenty-one. By that time he
already gave lectures on it at the University of Dundee, where
he had just been appointed assistant lecturer. This means that
he had produced a novelty in economic theory as a mere
youngster. From the later adventures of his novelty it will
become clear that it was far ahead of its time.
Possibly less remarkable is the fact, that no less than five
years went by before the publication of his discovery. A draft
of the article was completed by the early summer of 1934. (p.
48). As far as Coase remembers, only tlvery  few changes were in
fact made before the article was published in Economica in
1937. I' (ibid.) Even more strongly: "The  article published in
1937 was essentially the same as the draft of 1934." (ibid.)
Why then the three years delay? His reply to this question
lists a combination of factors (Meaning, p. 49-50), among them
a reluctancy  ((.. .to rush into print...", but also pressure of
work in preparing his lectures in different courses at the
universities of Dundee, Liverpool and the LSE successively.
1.3 More on Cease's  characteristics as a scientist
Answering our first question from the Introduction could
possibly be helped by searching for common traits in Coasels
early publications. What kind or kinds of publications were
they? By giving us a picture of Coase as a scientist in his
early period, they could help us to understand better why he
was able to make his discovery.
9We restrict our inquiry to the period before the four-years
gap in Coasels publication sequence caused by the Second World
War. His first professional publication dates back to 1935 and
the last one before the war gap appeared in 1940. Seven of the
eleven publications he authored or co-authored in these six
years seven will be typified here'.
His first publication was a purely theoretical one: "The
Problem of Duopoly Reconsidered" (1935). The object was I'...
to examine the problem of duopoly with the aid of the cost
curve apparatus developed by Professor Pigou, Mr. Harrod, Mrs.
Robinson, and others." (p. 137). This article demonstrates
that Coase, though originally not educated as a general
economist, by 1935 already was able to take part in a
contemporary discussion on price theory. Only two years before
the books on imperfect competition by Mrs. Robinson and
Chamberlin had given new inspiration to the discussion of
imperfect competition models. Its subject matter also confirms
something we learnt already from his own story in Origin, more
than fifty years later: he was deeply interested in the
relations between entrepreneurial decisions and market
influence.
In the same year, 1935, the first of a series of three
articles by Coase and R.H. Fowler on price expectations held
by producers appeared in print: "Bacon Production and the Pig
Cycle in Great Britain". It was inspired by the current
popularity of the idea that the 'cobweb theorem' provided a
good explanation of the so-called 'pig  cycle'. With the latter
term a certain regularity of price fluctuations on pig markets
or on pork product markets was meant. The cobweb theorem, then
only recently developed (e.g. by Tinbergen, 1930),  explained
regularities in price fluctuations by assuming the combination
of price-takership and 'static' price expectations on the
supply side of the market. The stated object of the paper by
Coase and Fowler is: II... to discover by an examination of the
post-war experience of the British pig industry whether this
argument is one which is really valid." (p. 144). Here they
l0f the other four one is his now famous 1937 article, one
is only a rejoinder, and two, both co-authored by R.S. Edwards
and R.F. Fowler, I didn't succeed to get hold of.
Y . , --
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did a thorough debunking job2. They showed, firstly, that
static price expectations are not in accordance with the facts
on the British bacon market. Secondly, they argued that these
facts could very well be in accordance with much more sensible
behaviour on the part of the pig breeders than was attributed
to them by the assumption of static price expectations.
The other two articles of this 'series' (Coase and Fowler
1937, 1940) were provoked by comments on the first one. Their
first paper had been restricted to demonstrating that static
price expectations did not make sense of the statistical
facts. In the second they attempted an explanation of these
facts, and in the third they even made an attempt at
discovering what the producers' expectations on this market
really could be. In the last paper there are two warnings (p.
286, p. 2881, that it would be wise not to copy blindly the
assumptions made by the authors. If one should try to discover
producer's expectations on other markets, it would be better
to study the particulars of the production structure in the
industry concerned first.
These warnings point to two lasting traits in Cease's oeuvre:
firstly, he time and again pleads with his fellow-economists
to study the details of individual cases before generalizing,
and not to indulge in 'armchair' theorizing. Secondly, he
practises  what he preaches".
In llSome  Notes on Monopoly Price" (1937a)  his skill in
handling price-theoretical shows up again. Now the objective
is not a purely technical one anymore: "This paper aims at
making monopoly analysis more useful by introducing certain of
the more important modifications which have to be made if Mrs.
Robinson's theory is to be of use in increasing our
understanding of the working of the actual economic system.ll
(p. 17). This paper may be typified as an attempt to translate
statical monopoly theory into a more realistic theory, that
.
'Later Coase did more of such debunking jobs. See for
instance his paper "The  Lighthouse in Economics11  (19741,  and
his famous 1937 and 1960 papers.
3To name only a few instances: he did so in his 1950 book
on British broadcasting, ' Federal CommunicationsCommission1 (1959),  and in hi?IL$Fhouse'  paper (1974).
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hopefully would throw light on the market behaviour of a
monopolistic firm 'of flesh and blood'. One of the essential
differences between such a firm and the one of static price
theory is that the real firm normally does not know the demand
curve for its product and, so, has to guess in its attempts to
maximize profits. Here we encounter Cease's interest in
imperfect information again, as in his more famous paper
published in that year. Here this notion is not used to
explain why firms exist, but to transform static monopoly
theory into a tool for describing real-life firm behaviour on
its product market.
In a series of twelve shorter pieces in The Accountant in
1938, Coase tried to explain to business men how they could
profit from knowing as much as possible about their
opportunity cost function before making their decisions (Coase
1973 [1938])4.  This argument was wholly in line with the
Austrian view of lcostsl as subjective opportunity costs. It
was shared by a small group of economists at the LSE, under
Arnold Plant (Coase, 1973, llIntroductory  NoteI',  pp. 97-8).
Together with R.S. Edwards and R.F. Fowler (the other members
of this group) Coase published two.papers in this period
(Coase, Edwards, Fowler 1938, 1939).
In the 1939 volume of Economica  Coase published a case study
in economic history "Rowland Hill and the Penny Post",  about
the postal reform in Britain in 1840. This reform led to an
early example of a 'uniform pricing system', a subject on
which Coase published more after the war (1947).
To conlude this survey, two general traits in Cease's oeuvre
can already be shown in his early work. Firstly, abstract
'theory of the firm' he only accepts as a first step towards
explaining real-firm behaviour on markets. It means that he
strives for greater realism in the description of the relevant
circumstances for decision making by the entrepreneur. (See
Coase and Fowler 1935, 1937 and 1940, plus Coase 1937 and
193,7a)  .
'As I am only acqainted  with the shortened one-piece 1973
version of this series, I count it as only one publication,
out of a total of eleven publications by Coase up to 1940.
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A second and related trait is Cease's sceptical attitude
towards general statements without sufficient empirical
evidence. 'Armchair theorizing' is rejected if it is not
followed by practical investigations inspired by the theory
(see also Coase 1972, 1982, and 1991). Repeatedly both traits
led him to investigations with debunking results: his work
(with Fowler) on the pig cycle and his 1937 article on the
nature of the firm are pre-war examples.*
2. Profound silence
During the first twenty years after its publication Cease's
1937 article was little noticed. In this period it did not
meet with any reaction whatsoever in the professional
journals. For many years there were no assenting or
repudiating references to it." The article is included in the
anthology Readings in Price Theory (19521, edited by Stigler
and Boulding on behalf of the American Economic Association,
and in the course of time more and more footnotes refer to it.
However, the analysis supplied by it is not really applied or
developed further. In 1972 Coase articulates this tersely:
11 . . . much cited and little used." (Coase (19721,  1988, p. 62;
quoted in Meaning, p. 51).
By the time he makes this observation, however, a change in
attitude by the profession had at last gotten into stride.
This change was presumably partially caused by a later
pathbreaking publication by Coase (19601,  in which he applies
the notion of transaction costs to another sphere. (See
section 3).
Here we shall give a tentative explanation of the long period
of silence about Cease's  article of 1937, in accordance with
the second question in our Introduction. For a start, we shall
summarize some obvious factors contributing to the lack of
attention by the profession. To begin with, 1937 belongs to
.
'Post-war examples are his 1960 paper on externalities,
and his 'Lighthouse' paper (1974).
6The first reference to it that I found in the journals
dates from 1955, in the QJE. Coase himself remarks that some
references to the article were made in the 1940's,  and more in
the 1950's.
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the years of the Great Depression and .obviously  much attention
was paid to that problem. This factor must have been very
strong indeed in 1937, for Keynes' "General TheoryI had just
appeared. It immediately attracted enormous attention and
caused intense debates, as is evidenced by the contents of
British and American professional journals at the time. (See
the Appendix, table 1).
However true this may be, it certainly does not mean that no
attention whatsoever was left for other questions, such as
those in price theory and what was later called "industrial
organizationll. The "General Theory" did not prevent that in
the next few years many articles on these micro-economic
subjects were published too. It was only from 1941 onwards
that the number of articles per volume of the leading perio-
dicals began to diminish greatly in Great Britain (but much
less so in the United States). (See the Appendix, table 2). By
then also a shift towards subjects connected with the war ef-
fort occurred. Obviously, the war years cannot explain the
pre-war part of the period of silence on Cease's article.
As far as these pre-war years are concerned, a development
within price theory itself seems to be of some importance as
an explaining factor. In the course of the 'thirties price
theory underwent a rigourous formalization, under the
influence of the approach of the Lausanne School. Until then
price theory in Great Britain had been under the spell of
Marshall. This meant that theoretical questions concerning the
functioning of markets and the role of firms were approached
by the Marshallian partial-equilibrium method. By this method
it was still possible to get glimpses of entrepreneurs of
flesh and blood, be it in a stylized way (as is necessarily
the case in all theoretical approaches).' In the course of the
'thirties the Walrasian method strongly gained in influence,
as is witnessed by, e.g., the following publications: Hicks &
Allen (1934),  Lerner (19341,  Lange (1936/1937),  Hicks (19391,
.
70n the Continent price theory had been more under the
influence of the Austrian School, but in this rival approach
the entrepreneur was sketched more or less as an active actor
too, albeit in a different way from Marshall's.
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and, from a methodological point of view, Robbins  (1938).'  The
more formalized and tautologized price theory became, the
further the notion of a 'firm' it employed moved away from the
real-life entity whose management has to make complicated
policy decisions.
With the help of a number of simplifying assumptions the tasks
of management were stylized into the well-known marginal cost
rule. Thus, the behaviour of the neoclassical 'entrepreneur'
(if we can still use that expression) was reduced to that of
an automaton. The decision making process was completely
stylized away and the firm was reduced to a 'black box'.
This reduction was no drawback in view of the aim, on behalf
of which the neoclassical theory was reformed in this way.
After all, the Walrasian aim was the analysis of the coordina-
ting abilities of the market system as a whole, in the case of
perfectly decentralized decisionmaking by 'economic agents'.'
Seen in the light of this aim only, all unnecessary compli-
cations could be left out for simplicity's sake. By assuming
'perfect information' for all agents and 'profit maximization'
in a timeless setting as the only objective of all firms, the
entrepreneur is reduced to a pure calculator, a truly Ilone-
dimensional manlllo. The other agents (consumers and suppliers
of production factors) are assumed to have the same one-dimen-
sional objective as the real and final one of the entrepre-
neur: 'utility maximizationlll.
-
*Whereas the first edition of Robbins's famous
methodological Essay (1932) still had a strong Austrian
flavour, the 'classical' second edition (1935) had much less.
Apparently his insights had changed in the direction of
formalized theory.
'See for instance Demsetz 1982.
"Profit maximization in fact is a derived objective. It
would imply utility maximization for the entrepreneur in this
theory, because profit is all the firm can offer the
entrepreneur in terms of his utility, on-the-job consumption
being assumed away by the reduction of the firm to a black box
(an indivisible particle). See Demsetz 1995, p. 11.
'IIn the case of the supplier of a production factor this
means, that he maximizes the difference between the utility he
can 'buy' with his total money remuneration on the one hand,
and the total disutility of losing his command over the sold
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The argument of Coase (1937) goes in a completely different
direction. Instead of reducing Marshall's firm to a Walrasian
black box, the notion of transaction costs asks us to taking a
closer look at the internal organization of the firm. Thus it
is no wonder that the article did not attract the attention it
merited, at least from 'neoclassical circles'. To be
tractable, the analysis of the market system as a coordination
device required 'bloodless' firms. As far as the realism of
this approach is concerned, a great part of the profession
continued to believe that, notwithstanding this increasing
formalization, its implications captured some essential
characteristics of the market system in the real world. The
latter did not satisfy all the assumptions made, but, as
Robbins  argued in both editions of his influential Essay
(1932, 19351, this did not matter as long as the fundamental
assumptions accorded with reality. He argued that this was
indeed the case. Thus belief that market-directed allocation
had a tendency to come into accordance with consumption
preferenc.es  in the economy (the latter weighted by each
consumer's purchasing power), remained strong in the 'thirties
and 'forties. In this respect there was no fundamental change
from the four preceding decades12.
As a stonesober outsider in the midst of this formalization
movement, Coase asked to what purpose firms were still
presumed to exist in this neoclassical world? If 'I(t normal
economic system works itself" (Sir Arthur Salter; quoted in
Coase (19371,  1988, p. 341, these particles of centrally
commanded economy have no function whatsoever. The continued
existence of the firm as a species in a market system with
competition suggests that it does perform a function, that
somehow this function is complementary to that performed by
the market system itself. Within neoclassical economics this
function remains in the dark. Though the firm, seen as an
organization controlled by the entrepreneur, is assumed to
exist, coordination in the economy is assumed to be performed
.
units of the production factor on the other.
"For instance, the much less formalized Austrian approach
to the market system had also been accepted by its adherents
on the basis of this heroic assumption, though normally the
assumption itself was kept implicit. An exception to this
lighthearted attitude will be mentioned shortly.
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entirely without it. From this point of view the firm seems to
be superfluous.
It is along this line of thinking that Coase makes his disco-
very : firms can have a reason for being only if they cause a
decrease in costs, as compared to market coordination of
actions by individuals only. In neoclassical theory such a
decrease is impossible, because all market exchange is
performed costlessly,in consequence of the assumption of
perfect information. In reality this clearly is not true.
Coase goes on to describe some types of transaction cost:
"The  most obvious cost of "organizingl'  production through
the price mechanism is that of discovering what the
relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it will
not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who
will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transac-
tion which takes place on a market must also be taken
into account. Again, in certain markets, e.g., produce
exchanges, a technique is devised for minimizing these
contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true
that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm,
but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or
the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of
contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if
this co-operation were a direct result of the working of
the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is
substituted one." (Coase (19371,  pp. 38-9).
Contract costs may also be reduced by the substitution of one
long-term contract for a series of short-term contracts (p.
39). Or, people may prefer a long-term contract on risk
grounds (ibid.).
"When the direction of resources (within the limits of
. the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way,
that relationship which I term a ,(firmU  may be obtained.
A firm is likely, therefore, to emerge in those cases
where a very short-term contract would be
unsatisfactory.fl (p. 40).
In order to be able to incorporate
transaction costs one must drop the
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all these types of
assumption of perfect
information.
Evidently it was asking too much from the refiners of neo-
classical theory to appreciate this comment on their work.
This becomes even more understandable if two more things are
taken into account. Firstly, dropping the assumption of
perfect information at that time would hopelessly have
complicated the formalization work-in-progress of neoclassical
theory. Secondly (and in our view more importantly) Cease's
aim differed from the neoclassical endeavour of analysing the
principles of market coordination. At the time his ultimate
objective at the time was an explanation of vertical and
lateral integration. For this reason his interest lay in the
firm as an organization. There is no reason why this matter
would have interested the neoclassical formalizers, as theirs
was a radically different objective.
Related to this formalization trend, another factor of impor-
tance for the neglect of Cease's  1937 article is to be detec-
ted by returning to Marshall's price theory which was
constructed from a partial-equilibrium approach13.  This means
that not the economy, but the industry is scrutinized. This
type of analysis demands that the industry is to a certain
degree isolated from the rest of the economy, which Marshall
did by applying the ceteris paribus assumption. As often
happens with a well thought-out theory by a genius, Marshall's
followers ran away with his subtle system. In some respects
they stylized the construction further, thereby simplifying
it. One of the simplifications was to restrict their attention
to the case of perfect competition. (Andriessen, 1965, p. 41).
It is well-known that in this market model an industry can
only reach a long-run equilibrium situation if the average
total cost curve of all the firms has a U-form. In a general-
equilibrium approach this shape of the curve may be assumed
without running into difficulties. However, Marshall's
partial-equilibrium approach runs into the difficulty that
rising long-run average cost must be caused by rising prices
of production factors. The impact of the latter is not re-
13The  following exposition is based on Andriessen, third
impression, 1965.
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stricted  to the industry concerned, but is also felt by all
other industries. But then the ceteris paribus assumption
becomes implausible and the partial-equilibrium approach runs
aground.
There are two conceivable alternatives to the U-form of the
average cost curve: it could be continuously descending or
horizontal. The first of these alternatives cannot be
reconciled with the notion of an industry equilibrium under
perfect competition. Thus only the other alternative remains:
constant average total cost as a function of firm output. This
alternative is not very attractive either, because a priori
there are no reasons why average total cost should as a rule
be constant. From this Sraffa (1926) concluded that there were
only two ways out of this difficulty: either it has to be
accepted that monopoly is a more usual outcome than perfect
competition (in case average total cost is a decreasing
function of output), or the partial-equilibrium approach must
be given up.
After this conclusion was made two camps arose amongst the
adherents of the partial-equilibrium approach . The first
comprised those who wanted to maintain Marshall's model.
Following him, they advanced the limitation of the life span
of the individual firm as an argument against monopolization
of the industry as the inevitable static outcome of the
dynamic competition process. The other camp tried to keep the
monopolization of the industry out of their theory with the
aid of assuming special conditions on the demand side of the
firm. This attempt to evade Sraffa's  conclusion culminated in
1933 in the publication of two influential books on
llmonopolistic competition11 by Chamberlin and Joan Robinson.
Under their influence the further development of theoretical
industry analysis was directed towards oligopoly. Both authors
maintained the assumption of perfect information, but dropped
the assumption of homogenous products. As was to be expected,
the admissibility of the assumption of heterogenity took a
central place in the debate brought about by this new
theoretical model, whereas 'perfect information' stayed out of
the discussion completely. We conclude that here is another
reason for the absolute neglect of Cease's approach. Not only
was it not in the mainstream, but it went directly against its
current.
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In view of all the factors mentioned it seems quite
understandable that, in view of general theoretical
developments, time really was not ripe yet for a warm welcome
or a sharp repudiation of Cease's innovation. More telling in
particular is the attitude of two rising stars in economics at
the time, because they were members of the same LSE staff as
Coase: Robbins and Hayek. Coase relates that neither of them
ever commented positively or negatively on his publication
11 . . . although my relations with both of them were quite
cordial . ..)I (Meaning, p. 51). With respect to Robbins, Coase
concludes, that attention from him for an article entitled
'IThe Nature of the Firm" was not to be expected, because
Robbins  I'...was devoted to high theory...", i.e. the
formalization of general equilibrium theory. In this regard it
is remarkable that several decades later Robbins  still did not
pay any attention to Cease's innovation (Robbins 19711,
although he normally had an open mind towards innovations.
Hayek's  silence, not only at the time, but for many decades on
end, seems even more remarkable. Coase does not go into that
in his retrospective, but it certainly is remarkable in view
of the fact that Hayek himself had touched upon the assumption
of 'perfect knowledge' only the year before. In a speech of
1936 he pointed out a number of difficulties one has to face
if one wants to apply the very stylized general equilibrium
theory to the market system of the real world. The speech was
published in 1937 in the same volume of Economica as Cease's
article - under the title uEconomics  and Knowledger  . Hayekls
argument focused on the differences between the roles played
by 'knowledge' in 'high theory' on the one hand, and in the
real world on the other. He tried to establish the minimal
content of 'perfect knowledge1 needed for enabling a model of
the market system to reach general equilibrium.
On the face of it this subject seems to be very strongly
related to the notion of imperfect information, on which Coase
constructed his transaction cost explanation of the firm.
Moreover, Hayek certainly must have taken notice of the
contents of Economica on a regular basis, because his own
speech was published in this 'natural' outlet for LSE authors,
as many more of his articles in the 'thirties and the first
half of the 'fourties were. So it seems strange that he did
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not discuss Cease's  contribution with his young colleague at
all. However, when both publications are contemplated a little
longer, important differences may be discerned between the two
viewpoints. Hayekls problem is the robustness of the
connection between the knowledge possessed by the agents in
the market economy and a tendency to general equilibrium.
Coase tries to reconcile the notions of coordination by the
market economy and the firm. Besides, the two approaches are
differently directed as regards the notion of a general
equilibrium. In Hayek's approach it is viewed to be the
situation only theoretically and ultimately to be reached by
way of the market process. That starts from a disequilibrium
situation and functions in 'real' time: it is a dynamic
process, possibly a 'converging' one. In Coasels approach,
however, the notion of general equilibrium, including the
usual assumption of perfect knowledge, is accepted as a
starting point, be it only in order to demonstrate that this
leaves no room for the firm as a viable organization.
Possibly an explanation for Hayek's complete neglect of
Cease's 1937 article must be searched for in this direction:
he may not have recognized it as a discussion related to his
own inquiry. This notwithstanding the fact that expressions of
the idea of imperfect knowledge are to be found at least five
times in the text plus notes of the article. Besides, an
argument adopting the idea that the market system does not
work costlessly could hardly have been experienced by Hayek as
helpful to his cause in his current debate on socialist
calculation with Lange et al.
In no later part of Hayek's oeuvre is anything done with
Cease's insight, and only one reference to Coase 1937 was
foundI'. This fact is remarkable, because Hayek in many of his
publications since 1937 devoted his mental powers repeatedly
to speculating on the consequences of the absence of the
'perfection' of information for the market system 15. As far
as could be verified, Coase on his part did not do anything
with Hayekls approach either. This mutual ignoring can
14Hayek, 1988, p. 36.
15See  :
1976,
Hayek 1940; 1944, Ch. 4; 1945; 1946; 1962; 1968;
notably Ch. 9 and 10; 1979, notably Ch. 15.
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possibly be explained by the following combination of
circumstances:
Firstly, Coase emphasises the cost of using the market mecha-
nism. Hayek, conversely, draws attention to its 'yield': by
using the market system the participants of the economic
process are enabled to make use of specific knowledge which is
present in the economy, but dispersed, and part of which is
even untransferable to people not on the same spot. Agents are
enabled to take advantage of it without having this specific
knowledge themselves. Thereby they enhance economic efficiency
in the economy without necessarily intending so .
Secondly, notwithstanding the assumption of transaction cost,
Coase continues to make use of the method of comparative
statics. For instance, in the final section of his 1937
article he concludes that in a market economy in general
equilibrium firms must exist with a view to economic
efficiency. From here he infers the consequences of an
exogenous change in the level of transaction costs for the
size and number of firms in the new equilibrium. In contrast,
Hayek refuses to take general equilibrium as a useful
guideline for studying the consequences of exogenous changes.
So, it is not unthinkable that - if he ever read Cease's final
section - he was deterred by it at once (and for decades
afterwards) from taking an interest in Cease's approach. But
on this we can of course only speculate.
3. The end of silence
After 1960 interest in Cease's  approach increased rapidly and
substantially. To this momentum he contributed himself with
his article The Problem of Social Cost (Coase 19601,  which
later became at least as famous as his 1937 article. The
neglect of transaction cost in traditional price theory is
again taken to task in this new paper. In 1937 Coase had
demonstrated that in traditional price theory firms lead a
completely fictionary  'life', as a consequence of the assump-
tion of costless markets. In 1960 he demonstrated that this
assumption makes "externalities" to a complete fiction too.
Pigou's expositions concerning government measures to correct
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for externalities (Pigou 1912, 1920)16 are demonstrated to be
floating in the air. Moreover, even the law is shown to be
completely superfluous in a world without transaction costs.
One event in the history leading to this new publication in an
'old' approach is interesting enough to relate here, because
it makes the rapid gaining of influence of Cease's approach
after 1960 more comprehensible. In the Journal  of Law &
Economics of 1959 an article by Coase was published concerning
the allocation of radio and television frequencies (Coase
1959). In it he gave his fundamental critique of neoclassical
price theory in a shortened form. The Journal was established
in 1958, under auspices of the University of Chicago Law
School. Coase came into contact with its editor Aaron Direc-
tor, who was professor of economics here. As related in Kitch
ted., 19831,  p. 220, Director informed Coase that one of the
referees wanted to see the passage containing the critique
skipped, because he held it for erroneousZ7.  I n his
autobiography Stigler (1985) describes the amazement Coasels
critique aroused in him and his colleagues at the University
of Chicago:
II
. . . Chicago economists could not understand how so fine
an economist as Coase could make so obvious a mistake."
(p.  75) -
Coase persisted, and, when he was invited by Stigler to come
to Chicago and (I... give a paper or present something at the
Industrial Organization workshoprl (ibid.), he accepted on
condition that he could also on some occasion present his
views on this other question (Kitch 1983, p.220). I'Some  twenty
economists from the University of Chicago and Ronald Coase
assembled one evening at the home of Aaron Director." (Stigler
1985, p. 75). Among them were Stigler, Director, Milton Fried-
man, Reuben Kessel, John McGee, Lloyd Mintz, Arnold Harberger,
Gregg Louis, and Martin Bailey (Kitch 1983, p. 221). In his
talk Coase succeeded in convincing his audience that
externalities would not exist in a world without transaction
costs. From this follows compellingly: "In a regime of zero
16See  Coase 1960, p. 28, note 35.
17As related in Kitch ted.), 1983, p. 220.
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transaction costs, lawyers would perish.l' (Stigler 1985, p.
76).
"But  Ronald asked us also to believe a second proposition
about this world without transaction costs: Whatever the
assignment of legal liability for damages, or whatever
the assignment of legal rights of ownership, the as-
signments would have no effect upon the way economic
resources would be used! We strongly objected to this
heresy. Milton Friedman did much of the talking, as
usual. He also did much of the thinking, as usual. In the
course of two hours of argument the vote went from twenty
against and one for Coase to twenty-one for Coase. What
an exhilarating event!" (ibid.)
From this eyewitness report two things emerge which are impor-
tant for answering our third question ("What  caused its break-
through into the profession's interest at last?U). In the
first place, at that time first-class minds even were still
not ripe for accepting Cease's approach without help.
Secondly, these influential Chicago economists (who were no
Walrasians in their orientation) were turned around in one
evening's time, somewhere in the first half of 1960. This
helps to explain why Cease's approach gained influence so
quickly after 1960. At the invitation of Director, Coase wrote
out his argument for the 1960 issue of the Journal of Law &
Economics, which appeared sometime before May 1961 (Kitch,  p.
221). This article gained rather soon a reputation. This is
shown by the fact that "the  Coase Theorem" (the name Stigler
invented for the bogus existence of the law in a neoclassical
world without transaction costs) had already made its way into
intermediate textbooks on price theory by the mid-1970ts1*.
As the method of Cease's (1960) is the same as that of Coase
(1937) - i.e., the assumption of positive transaction costs
and an investigation of its consequences compared with those
of neoclassical theory - the following hypothesis seems to be
warranted: The relatively quick general acceptance of the
"For  instance: Hirhleifer's  (1976). Stigler, of course,
was very early; he incorporated it in the third edition of his
textbook nTheory of Price", which was published in 1966,
already.
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fundamental insight offered by the later article helped in
clearing the way for giving attention to the fundamental
insight offered by the old article. Coase shares this
hypothesis (Influence, p. 62).
Soon after 1960 some new schools within general economics
gained momentum. Authors like Stigler, Alchian, Demsetz,
Cheung, Furubotn, and Pejovich published on various topics
related to "property rights" and saw their papers accepted,
not only by the 'maverick' Journal of Law and Economics, but
by more traditional general economics journals as welll'. The
emerging school of Itlaw and economics", which originated from
the University of Chicago Law School, gained a foothold in the
general economics profession, as witnessed by, e.g., MaMe
1965 in JPE, Calabresi 1970, Demsetz 1974, Becker 1968 in
JPE'O.
Adjacent to the property rights approach the oeuvre of
Douglass C. North began to expand. It can be characterized as
an application of the property rights view to the development
of types of economic organization of societies in history.
Last but not least, a modern theory of the firm begins to be
developed. This development is to be seen as a direct (be it
belated) descendant of Cease's  old article. Of the many names
that could be mentioned in this connection only a few follow
here: Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Jensen and Meckling  1976
("Agency Theory"), Chandler 1977, Nelson and Winter 1982 and
practically the whole oeuvre of 0-E.  Williamson, spanning some
lgStigler  1961 in JPE; Alchian 1965 in the Journal of
Industrial Economics; Alchian 1969 in MaMe  ted.); Alchian and
Demsetz 1972 in AEX; Alchian and Demsetz 1973 in JEH; Demsetz
1967 in AER; F'urubotn  and Pejovich 1972 in JEL; Pejovich 1969
in Western economic Journal.
"The  Property Rights approach and Law and Economics can
only be distinguished from a historical point of view.
Alchian, for instance, who was one of the originators of the
first-mentioned approach, never was a member of the Chicago
Law School, or of the University of Chicago at all, and from
this point of view cannot be described as a 'Chicago
economist'. Since the early 'sixties, however the two
historically different approaches soon converged into one. See
also Posner, 1993, p. 82, note 16.
---
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thirty years*l.
Of course, the impact of Coasels 1960 article was not the only
catalytic agent in the rapid development of all these
'Coasian' approaches to economic problems. Another important
factor was the growing disappointment in the 'structure-
conduct-performance' approach to "Industrial Organization". In
these years it became ever more clear that this approach
failed in at least two respects: it could not be integrated
properly into Neoclassical price theory, and it was not able
to produce an independent logical explanation for the
interdependencies between technical and economic developments
in an individual industry on the one hand, and market power
distribution over individual firms in that industry on the
other.**
4. Concluding remarks
In retrospect, we may typify the new approach taken by Coase
in 1937 as an extraordinary stimulating and fruitful one, be
it only after a remarkably long gestation period. Our answers
to the questions posed in the Introduction above may be
summarized thus:
1 . Cease's  discovery is to be ascribed to an exceptional
combination of wits, sober scepticism, intellectual
independence from current mainstream economics and a
strong urge to learn the basic interactions between firm
organization and market conditions in the real world.
2. The profession at large did not pick up Coasels approach
until decades later, mainly because at the time its
interests were developing in radically different
directions.
3. The breakthrough came only after, and partly as a result
of, Cease's  1960 publication. Growing disappointment with
the structure-conduct-performance approach in 'Industrial
Organization' also played a role in this.
'lFor a methodological critique of Williamson's choice of
assumptions see Elzas, ~~Williamson~s I New Institutional
Economics' : a case for using O&ham's  Razor" (forthcoming).
*'For a succinct survey of the difficulties in this
respect see Demsetz (1974) 1989, Ch. 7.
I
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Appendix
Table 1
Number of "macro" article& in three British' and three
1940 4
1941 8 6 2 16 2 5 2 9 25
'Subjects: business cycle theory, capital theory, theory of
interest, growth theory.
*Economic Journal, Economica, and Review of Economic Stu-
dies.
3Quarterly Journal of Economics, American Economic Review,
and Journal of Political Economy.
'First volume: October 1933-June  1934.
?7olumes  run from November to August.
Table 2
Average number of articles per volume in three British and
three American professional journals1 for three periods
Period UK USA
1931-1941 22,5 30,l
. 1942-1946 15,5 26,4
1947-1960 23,9 30,7
'See Table 1, notes 2 and 3, for the names of the journals.
-
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